

**DECLARATION FORM ON NOTHING TO DECLARE OR NOTHING NEW TO
DECLARE FOR USE IN THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE**

Measure	Nothing to declare	Nothing new to declare
A, part I	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A, part 2 (iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B (i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B (ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(Please mark the appropriate box(es) for each measure, with a tick.)

Date: *10 April 2007*

State Party to the Convention: **Sweden**

Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories¹#1

1. Name(s) of facility² *Swedish Defence Research Agency
CBRN Defence and Security*
2. Responsible public or private organization or company *Swedish Defence Research Agency*
3. Location and postal address *Cementvägen 20, SE-901 82 Umeå, Sweden

www.foi.se*
4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Defence, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Private Research Grants
5. Number of maximum containment units³ within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m²)

0
6. If no maximum containment unit, indicate highest level of protection

BSL3

¹The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.

²For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".

³In accordance with the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed. 2004 or equivalent

7. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

Medical countermeasures against BW

The bacterial pathogens Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, Yersinia pestis (vaccine strains EV76 or KIM5), Francisella tularensis subsp holarctica and Pseudomonas aeruginosa as well as the viruses Hantaviruses, genotype, Puumala, Seoul, Hantaan and Dobrava and Rift Valley Fever virus (phlebovirus) are studied. The focus of the research is to identify and characterise key virulence factors of these pathogens and to evaluate the potential of these factors as targets for therapy or as protective antigens in component vaccines. In another line of research bioinformatics and functional genomics is used to identify generic targets common to many bacterial pathogens that could serve as targets for generic treatment methods.

Methods for identification of BW

Methods are developed for detection and identification of bacteria, viruses and toxins using laser-induced Fluorescence, chip array, a variety of PCR methods, immunological techniques and masspectrometric methods. To be able to evaluate B-detection instruments using BW-stimulants, train NBC-company conscripts and to verify dispersion models field trial capacity for outdoor biological detection is established. The results are published in scientific journals.

Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories^{4#2}

1. Name(s) of facility⁵ *SMI:s säkerhetslaboratorium
(BSL3-BSL4 Laboratory)*

2. Responsible public or private organization or company *Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control
(SMI)*

3. Location and postal address *SMI, SE-171 82 Solna, Sweden*

www.smittskyddsinstitutet.se

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (additional grants from Swedish Emergency Management Agency)

5. Number of maximum containment units⁶ within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m²)

3 (20, 24 and 47)

6. If no maximum containment unit, indicate highest level of protection

7. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

⁴The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.

⁵For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".

⁶In accordance with the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed. 2004 or equivalent

Work on BSL-3 agents

Bacteria. Containment units (BSL-3) are used for diagnostic and research work on bacteria: Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp, Francisella tularensis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Yersinia pestis.

Viruses. Containment units (BSL-3) are used for diagnostic and research work on virus: Bunyaviruses, Flaviviruses, Arenaviruses, Rabies viruses, Avian Influenza virus.

Work on BSL-4 agents

Containment units (BSL-4) are used for diagnostic and research work on virus: Bunyaviruses, Flaviviruses, Arenaviruses, Filoviruses, SARS CoV and highly pathogenic Avian influenza virus.

Methods for detection and evaluation of antibiotic resistance

National and international standard methods are used for detection. Cultivation, staining, ELISA, PCR, Q-PCR and microarrays are examples of methods in use. Development of diagnostic methods for BSL-3 and BSL-4 agents is based on genetic techniques as well as recombinant technology.

The general goals are to: improve laboratory diagnostics and basic knowledge on highly pathogenic agents. The studies include, in addition to development of efficient and reliable diagnostics, e.g. virulence, pathogenesis, animal models and vaccine development.

The activities are funded mainly by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, National Board of Health (SoS), Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Swedish Research Council, and the European Union.

Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories⁷#3

1. Name(s) of facility⁸ *National Veterinary Institute*

2. Responsible public or private organization or company *National Veterinary Institute*

3. Location and postal address *Ulls väg 2 B, Ultuna Campus
SE-751 89 Uppsala, Sweden*

www.sva.se

4. Source(s) of financing of the reported activity, including indication if the activity is wholly or partly financed by the Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Agriculture and grants from the Swedish Emergency Management Agency

5. Number of maximum containment units⁹ within the research centre and/or laboratory, with an indication of their respective size (m²)

0

6. If no maximum containment unit, indicate highest level of protection

4 different containment units are designed according to BSL 3 laboratory work with a total size of 296 m²

7. Scope and general description of activities, including type(s) of micro-organisms and/or toxins as appropriate

⁷The containment units which are fixed patient treatment modules, integrated with laboratories, should be identified separately.

⁸For facilities with maximum containment units participating in the national biological defence research and development programme, please fill in name of facility and mark "Declared in accordance with Form A, part 2 (iii)".

⁹In accordance with the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed. 2004 or equivalent

General description of activities of the National Veterinary Institute

The National Veterinary Institute (SVA) is a Swedish national authority that strives for good animal and human health, a good environment and sustainable food production. SVA is a national and international reference laboratory of some contagious and other serious infectious diseases of animals that may imply a threat to both animal and human health. SVA's most important task is to be well prepared in dealing with these diseases by rapid and reliable diagnosis in order to establish and limit possible outbreaks, to prevent the spread of infection, and to limit economic losses. Research and development is of the utmost importance for solving the tasks and a publication list of relevant biological research can be obtained from SVA. Grants from the Swedish Emergency Management Agency are used for preparedness purposes applied to the development of diagnostic methods for an emergency situation such as natural outbreaks, accidents and/or deliberate release of BSL-3 agents.

Work on BSL-3 micro-organisms

Containment units (BSL 3, 81 m²) are used for diagnostic work on bacteria: Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp, Chlamydophila psittaci, Francisella tularensis, Mycobacterium bovis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Yersinia pestis.

Containment units (BSL 3, 155 m²) are used for diagnostic work on virus: Classical Swine Fever (CSF), Hanta virus, Hepatitis E virus, Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCM), High Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) virus, Rabies virus, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE), West Nile virus.

Methods for detection and evaluation of antibiotic resistance

National and international standard methods are used for detection. Cultivation, staining, ELISA and PCR are examples of methods in use. Development of diagnostic methods for BSL-3 agents is based on genetic techniques such as real-time PCR. Development of methods to characterise antibiotic resistance in BSL-3 agents is based on phenotypic micro dilutions methods such as (VETmic™), and genetic methods such as PCR and sequencing.

National biological defence research and development programme Declaration

Is there a national programme to conduct biological defence research and development within the territory of the State Party, under its jurisdiction or control anywhere? Activities of such a programme would include prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

YES

If the answer is Yes, complete Form A, part 2 (ii) which will provide a description of the programme.

National biological defence research and development programme**Description**

1. State the objectives and funding of the programme and summarize the principal research and development activities conducted in the programme. Areas to be addressed shall include: prophylaxis, studies on pathogenicity and virulence, diagnostic techniques, aerobiology, detection, treatment, toxinology, physical protection, decontamination and other related research.

Objectives:

Medical countermeasures against BW

The bacterial pathogens Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, Yersinia pestis (vaccine strains EV76 or KIM5), Francisella tularensis subsp holarctica and Pseudomonas aeruginosa as well as the viruses Hantaviruses, genotype, Puumala, Seoul, Hantaan and Dobrava and Rift Valley Fever virus (phlebovirus) are studied. The focus of the research is to identify and characterise key virulence factors of these pathogens and to evaluate the potential of these factors as targets for therapy or as protective antigens in component vaccines. In another line of research bioinformatics and functional genomics is used to identify generic targets common to many bacterial pathogens that could serve as targets for generic treatment methods.

Methods for identification of BW

Methods are developed for detection and identification of bacteria, viruses and toxins using laser-induced Fluorescence, chip array, a variety of PCR methods, immunological techniques and masspectrometric methods. To be able to evaluate B-detection instruments using BW-stimulants, train NBC-company conscripts and to verify dispersion models field trial capacity for outdoor biological detection is established. The results are published in scientific journals.

2. State the total funding for the programme and its source.

25.7 million SEK by Ministry of Defence and Ministry for Foreign Affairs

3. Are aspects of this programme conducted under contract with industry, academic institutions, or in other non-defence facilities?

YES

4. If yes, what proportion of the total funds for the programme is expended in these contracted or other facilities?

2%

Form A, part 2 (iii)**National biological defence research and development programme#1**

Information under paragraph IX for year 2006 (list of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from the work during the previous 12 months)

Publication of relevant biological research at FOI NBC Defence

The recommendation for publication, at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, is to publish results of biological research in international journals. Some results are published as public FOI-reports, abstract of which are submitted to the NTIS Database (National Technical Information Service). Reprints of scientific papers and FOI-reports can be ordered by writing to: Swedish Defence Research Agency, SE-901 82 Umeå, Sweden.

List of publication for 2006

Edqvist, PJ, Bröms JE, Betts, HJ, Forsberg, Å, Pallen MJ and Francis MS. 2006. Tetratricopeptide repeats in the type III secretion chaperone, LcrH: their role in substrate binding and secretion. *Mol Microbiol.* 59:31-44

Lavander, M, Ericsson, SK, Bröms, JB and Forsberg, Å. 2006. The twin arginine translocation system is essential for virulence of *Yersinia pseudotuberculosis*. *J. Bacteriology* 74:1768-76

Forslund, A-L, Kuoppa, K, Svensson, K, Salomonsson, E, Johansson, A, Byström, M, Oyston, P, Michell S, Titball, R, Noppa, L, Frithz-Lindsten, E, Forsman, M, and Forsberg, Å. 2006. Direct Repeat Mediated Deletion of a Type IV Pilin Gene Results in Major Virulence Attenuation of *Francisella tularensis*. *Mol Microbiol*, 59:1818-30.

Bröms, J.E., Edqvist, P.J., Forsberg, Å., Francis, M.S. 2006. Tetratricopeptide repeats are essential for PcrH chaperone function in *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* type III secretion *FEMS Microbiol Lett.* 256:57-66.

Pavkova I, Reichelova M, Larsson P, Hubalek M, Vackova J, Forsberg A, Stulik J. 2006. Comparative proteome analysis of fractions enriched for membrane-associated proteins from *Francisella tularensis* subsp. *tularensis* and *F. tularensis* subsp. *holarctica* strains. *J Proteome Res.* 11:3125-34.

Jonsson Per, Kullander Fredrik, Vahlberg Claes, Tiihonen Mikael, Wästerby Pär, Tjärnhage Torbjörn, Lindgren Mikael. *Spectral detection of ultraviolet laser induced fluorescence from individual bioaerosol particles* Bergen, June 14-16, 2006 (Northern Optics 2006, Proc. p. 142)

P. Jonsson, F. Kullander, C. Vahlberg, P. Jelger, M. Tiihonen, P. Wästerby, T. Tjärnhage, M. Lindgren. *Spectral detection of ultraviolet laser induced fluorescence from individual bioaerosol particles*,; *Optically Based Biological and Chemical Detection for Defence III*, Eds. J. C. Carrano, A. Zukauskas, Proc. SPIE Vol. 6398 (2006), 63980F/1-12.

P. Jonsson, F. Kullander, C. Vahlberg, O. Gustavsson, M. Tiihonen, P. Jelger, P. Wästerby, T. Tjärnhage, M. Lindgren. *Spectral detection of ultraviolet laser induced fluorescence from dry*

biological particles; 7th Joint Conference on Standoff Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense; 23-27 oktober 2006.

P. Wästerby, T. Tjärnhage, P. Wikström, P. Jonsson, F. Kullander, C. Vahlberg, M. Nilsson, J. Järvius, J. Melin, M. Tiihonen, P. Jelger, M. Lindgren. *Optical detection for early warning and identification of biological threats*; 5th Singapore International Symposium on Protection Against Toxic Substances (SISPAT); 27 november-1 december 2006.

Tomaso H., Scholz H., Neubauer H., Al Dahouk S., Landt O., Selbold E., Forsman M., Splettstoesser. 2006. Development of a real-time PCR using hybridization probes for the rapid and specific identification of *Francisella tularensis* subspecies *tularensis*. *Mol. Cellular Probes*, 21:12-16

Hajjar A. M., Harvey M. D., Shaffer S. A., Goodlett D. R., Sjöstedt A., Edebro H., Forsman M., Pelletier M., Wilson C. B., Miller S. I., Skerrett S.J., and Ernst R. K. 2006. Lack of in vitro and in vivo recognition of *Francisella* subspecies LPS by Toll-like receptors. *Infection and Immunity*, 74:6730-6738

Nording M., Frech K., Persson Y., Forsman M., Haglund P. 2006. On the semi semi-quantification of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in contaminated soil by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay kit. *Analytica Chimica Acta*. 555:107–113

Rohmer L, Brittnacher M, Kaul R, Svensson K, Johansson A, Forsman M, Miller SI. 2006. Potential source of *Francisella tularensis* live vaccine strain attenuation determined by genome comparison. *Infection and Immunity*, 12:6895-906.

Eliasson H., Broman T., Forsman M., and Bäck E., 2006. Tularemia: Current Epidemiology and disease management. *Infect. Dis. Clin. N. Am.* 20:289-311.

Wallensten A, Munster V. J., Osterhaus A, Waldenström J, Bonnedahl J, Broman T, Fouchier R, Olsen B. 2006 Mounting evidence for the presence of influenza A virus in the avifauna of the Antarctic region. *Antarctic Science* 18, 353–356

Form A, part 2 (iii)**National biological defence research and development programme#2**

Information under paragraph IX for year 2006 (list of publicly-available papers and reports resulting from the work during the previous 12 months)

Publication of relevant biological research at Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control (SMI)

The recommendation for publication, at the Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control, is to publish results of biological research in international journals. Reprints of scientific papers can be ordered by writing to:

Center for microbiological preparedness, Swedish Institute of Infectious Disease Control, SE-171 82 Solna, Sweden

List of publication for 2006

Connolly-Andersen AM, Magnusson KE, Mirazimi A.
Basolateral entry and release of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus in polarized MDCK-1 cells.
J Virol. 2007 Mar;81(5):2158-64. Epub 2006 Dec 13.

Akerstrom S, Mirazimi A, Tan YJ.
Inhibition of SARS-CoV replication cycle by small interference RNAs silencing specific SARS proteins, 7a/7b, 3a/3b and S.
Antiviral Res. 2007 Mar;73(3):219-27. Epub 2006 Nov 7.

Klingstrom J, Akerstrom S, Hardestam J, Stoltz M, Simon M, Falk KI, Mirazimi A, Rottenberg M, Lundkvist A.
Nitric oxide and peroxy nitrite have different antiviral effects against hantavirus replication and free mature virions.
Eur J Immunol. 2006 Oct;36(10):2649-57.

Akerstrom S, Tan YJ, Mirazimi A.
Amino acids 15-28 in the ectodomain of SARS coronavirus 3a protein induces neutralizing antibodies.
FEBS Lett. 2006 Jul 10;580(16):3799-803. Epub 2006 Jun 12.

Simon M, Falk KI, Lundkvist A, Mirazimi A.
Exogenous nitric oxide inhibits Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus.
Virus Res. 2006 Sep;120(1-2):184-90. Epub 2006 May 2.

Andersson I, Lundkvist A, Haller O, Mirazimi A.

Type I interferon inhibits Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus in human target cells.
J Med Virol. 2006 Feb;78(2):216-22.

Vene S, Haglund M, Lundkvist A, Lindquist L, Forsgren M.
Study of the serological response after vaccination against tick-borne encephalitis in Sweden.
Vaccine. 2007 Jan 4;25(2):366-72. Epub 2006 Aug 2.

Skarpaas T, Golovljova I, Vene S, Ljostad U, Sjursen H, Plyusnin A, Lundkvist A.
Tickborne encephalitis virus, Norway and Denmark.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2006 Jul;12(7):1136-8.

Jensenius M, Montelius R, Berild D, Vene S.
Scrub typhus imported to Scandinavia.
Scand J Infect Dis. 2006;38(3):200-2.

Jensenius M, Fournier PE, Fladby T, Hellum KB, Hagen T, Prio T, Christiansen MS, Vene S, Raoult D, Myrvang B.
Sub-acute neuropathy in patients with African tick bite fever.
Scand J Infect Dis. 2006;38(2):114-8.

Hugot JP, Plyusnina A, Herbreteau V, Nemirov K, Laakkonen J, Lundkvist A, Supputamongkol Y, Henttonen H, Plyusnin A.
Genetic analysis of Thailand hantavirus in *Bandicota indica* trapped in Thailand.
Virol J. 2006 Sep 5;3:72.

Klingstrom J, Hardestam J, Stoltz M, Zuber B, Lundkvist A, Linder S, Ahlm C.
Loss of cell membrane integrity in puumala hantavirus-infected patients correlates with levels of epithelial cell apoptosis and perforin.
J Virol. 2006 Aug;80(16):8279-82.

Kallio ER, Klingstrom J, Gustafsson E, Manni T, Vaheri A, Henttonen H, Vapalahti O, Lundkvist A.
Prolonged survival of Puumala hantavirus outside the host: evidence for indirect transmission via the environment.
J Gen Virol. 2006 Aug;87(Pt 8):2127-34.

Wallensten A, Munster VJ, Karlsson M, Lundkvist A, Brytting M, Stervander M, Osterhaus AD, Fouchier RA, Olsen B.
High prevalence of influenza A virus in ducks caught during spring migration through Sweden.
Vaccine. 2006 Nov 10;24(44-46):6734-5. Epub 2006 Jun 6.

Plyusnin A, Vaheri A, Lundkvist A.
Saaremaa hantavirus should not be confused with its dangerous relative, Dobrava virus.
J Clin Microbiol. 2006 Apr;44(4):1608-9;

Donati D, Espmark E, Kironde F, Mbidde EK, Kanya M, Lundkvist A, Wahlgren M, Bejarano MT, Falk KI.

Clearance of circulating Epstein-Barr virus DNA in children with acute malaria after antimalaria treatment.

J Infect Dis. 2006 Apr 1;193(7):971-7. Epub 2006 Mar 1.

Klingstrom J, Hardestam J, Lundkvist A.

Dobrava, but not Saaremaa, hantavirus is lethal and induces nitric oxide production in suckling mice.

Microbes Infect. 2006 Mar;8(3):728-37. Epub 2006 Jan 17.

Schmidt J, Meisel H, Capria SG, Petraityte R, Lundkvist A, Hjelle B, Vial PA, Padula P, Kruger DH, Ulrich R.

Serological assays for the detection of human andes hantavirus infections based on its yeast-expressed nucleocapsid protein.

Intervirology. 2006;49(3):173-84.

Smedby KE, Lindgren CM, Hjalgrim H, Humphreys K, Schollkopf C, Chang ET, Roos G, Ryder LP, Falk KI, Palmgren J, Kere J, Melbye M, Glimelius B, Adami HO.

Variation in DNA repair genes ERCC2, XRCC1, and XRCC3 and risk of follicular lymphoma.

Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev. 2006 Feb;15(2):258-65.

Bossolasco S, Falk KI, Ponzoni M, Ceserani N, Crippa F, Lazzarin A, Linde A, Cinque P.

Ganciclovir is associated with low or undetectable Epstein-Barr virus DNA load in cerebrospinal fluid of patients with HIV-related primary central nervous system lymphoma.

Clin Infect Dis. 2006 Feb 15;42(4):e21-5. Epub 2006 Jan 11.

Stuen S, Moum T, Bernhoft A, Vene S.

A parietic condition in an Anaplasma phagocytophilum infected roe deer calf.

J Wildl Dis. 2006 Jan;42(1):170-4.

Abd, H., A. Weintraub, and G. Sandström.

Intracellular behaviour of *Vibrio cholerae* O 1 strains during interaction with the environmental free-living amoeba *Acanthamoeba castellanii*. FEMS Microbial Ecology . 2006.

Mohapatra A., Leul M., Sandström G. and Sellstedt A.

Hydrogen evolution and characterization of the hydrogen evolving enzyme in *Frankia*.2006.

International J. of Hydrogen Energy

Mörner, T., and G.Sandström.

Tularemia, OIE Manual 2006.; Chapter 3.7.2.

H.Abd, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm.PhD 2006. Interaction between waterborne pathogenic bacteria and *Acanthamoeba castellanii*.Dissertation

Form B (i)**Background information on outbreaks of reportable
infectious human diseases**

Disease	Number of reported cases per year					
	2006	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<i>Population</i>		<i>8908</i>	<i>8940</i>	<i>8961,593</i>	<i>8961,593</i>	
Amoeba infection	259	456	419	416	416	
Atypical mycobacteria	348	247	250	269	269	348
Botulism	2	0	0	2	2	1
Campylobacter infection	6078	8577	7137	7149	7149	6796
Diphtheria	0	0	0	0	0	0
EHEC O157	265	96	129	73	73	
Giardiasis	1282	1438	1436	1360	1360	1151
Gonorrhoea	677	529	505	596	596	691
Yellow fever	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haemophilus infl. type b	123	19	21	23	23	
Hepatitis A	80	169	76	122	122	93
Hepatitis B	1208	1517	1734	1940	1940	1438
Hepatitis C	1976	3493	3382	3222	3222	2610
Hepatitis D	22	9	12	6	6	11
Hepatitis E	5	2	5	3	3	10
HIV infection	390	277	287	379	379	392

HTLV	5	4	7	6	6	7
Pertussis	795	979	1350	664	664	1360
Chlamydia	32518	22266	24692	26803	26803	33060
Cholera	1	0	0	1	1	1
Legionellosis	105	84	94	80	80	107
Listeriosis	42	67	40	48	48	40
Malaria	93	161	140	113	113	114
Meningococcal infection	52	75	47	56	56	58
MRSA	1057	425	442	549	549	975
Anthrax	0	0	0	0	0	0
Measels	20	5	9	3	3	13
Puumala virus infection (HFRS)	213	361	262	180	180	329
Ornithosis	2	12	13	12	12	5
Paratyphoid	31	21	25	16	16	21
Plague	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pc-resist. Pneumococci	631	627	525	562	562	664
Polio	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mumps	60	22	15	8	8	81
Rabies	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rubella	3	3	1	0	0	0
Salmonellosis (total)	4056	4711	3894	3794	3794	3571
Salmonellosis (domestic)	1010	671	819	805	805	655

Shigellosis	429	540	379	372	372	571
Tetanus	1	1	0	0	0	1
Syphilis	172	78	128	179	179	99
Toxoplasmosis	0	18	10	17	17	
Trichinosis	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tuberculosis	498	428	418	445	445	575
Tularemia	241	27	160	698	698	246
Typhoid	12	10	12	14	14	8
Ulcus molle	0	1	1	0	0	2
VRE	24	18	19	46	46	33
Viral hemorrhagic fevers	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yersiniosis	558	579	610	714	714	742
Relapsing fever	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	55344	48352	48686	50945	50945	47847

Brucellosis	4				3	14
Cryptosporidiosis	103				46	69
Dengue fever	54				24	62
Echinococcosis	7				9	12
Entamoeba histolytica	5				358	303
Streptococcal infection, group A	321				119	252
Haemophilus influenzae invasiv	123				73	118
Leptospirosis	2				2	3

Pneumococcal infection, invasive	1334				406	1420
Q fever	1				1	3
Total					56822	

Form B (ii)

Information on outbreaks of infectious human diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern

There are no cases for the reporting period on outbreaks of infectious human diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern.

**Background information on outbreaks of reportable
infectious animal diseases**

Disease	Number of outbreaks per year					
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006 ⁹
Botulism ¹	-	3	4	5	2	5
VTEC ²	4	2	0	1	4	1
Malignant catarrhal fever (MCF) ³	9	7	7	5	8	2
Newcastle disease ⁴	1	-	1	1	2	1
Psittacosis ⁵	1	4	3	5	1	5
Tuberculosis ⁶	1	-	-	1	1	-
Tularemia ⁷	-	4	11	2	5	4
<i>Salmonella</i> Infection (Salmonellosis) ⁸						

¹ The cases originate from following animals: cattle, poultry, mallard, jackdaw, dog, gull

² Infections caused by Verocytotoxic E. coli O157 (often referred to EHEC in many reports) are notifiable in animals if there is an epidemiological link to human infection. Animal species: cattle, goat

³ The cases originate from following animals: cattle, sheep

⁴ The cases originate from following animals: poultry, fowls

⁵ The cases originate from following animals: birds, partridge, parrot

⁶ The cases originate from following animals: elephant. The outbreak of 2004 was diagnosed and confirmed during 2005.

⁷ The cases originate from following animals: hare, squirrel, monkey.

⁸ Any finding of *Salmonella* in animals, humans, feed and food of animal origin is notifiable. Reprints of the annual report "trends and sources of zoonotic infections recorded in Sweden" can be obtained from the Swedish Zoonosis Center at SVA, which includes *Salmonella* cases in animals, humans, feed and food.

⁹ From January – September 2006.

Form B (ii)

Information on outbreaks of infectious animal diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern

There are no cases for the reporting period on outbreaks of infectious human diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern.

4. **CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE "C":**

- **Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge**

See under Form A, part 2 (iii), information provided under paragraph IX.

Active promotion of contacts #1

1. Planned international conferences, symposia, seminars, and other similar forums for exchange

For each such event, the following information should be provided:

- name of the conference, etc.
The ninth international symposium on protection against chemical and biological warfare agents.
- arranging organization(s), etc.
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) together with several other Swedish defence authorities, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- time
June 2007
- place
Gothenburg, Sweden
- main subject(s) for the conference, etc.
CBW protection, in a broad sense. Focus on technical and scientific reports and discussions. Exhibition.
- conditions for participation
Open for people professionally active in any of the fields.
- point of contact for further information, registration, etc.
Mrs. Marianne Olofsson, FOI (Marianne.olofsson@foi.se)

Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures

<u>Relating to</u>	<u>Legislation</u>	<u>Regulations</u>	<u>Other measures</u>	<u>Amended since last year</u>
(a) Development, production stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I	<u>YES</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
(b) Exports of micro-organisms* and toxins	<u>YES</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
(c) Imports of micro-organisms* and toxins	<u>YES</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>

Comments: A list of Swedish laws and regulations can be found in documents:

BWC/MSP.2003/MX/WP.62 of 4 September 2003

(BTWC and related legislation prepared by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom).

BWC/MSP/2004/MX/WP.17 of 16 July 2004

(A short introduction to the Swedish system to manage outbreaks of infectious diseases among humans and animals).

* Micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants in accordance with the Convention.

Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes

1. Date of entry into force of the Convention for the State party.

5 February 1976

(The Convention was signed by Sweden on 27 February 1975. The Convention was ratified by Sweden on 5 February 1976 and entered into force for Sweden the same date. The text of the Convention is published in the Swedish Treaty Series, SÖ 1976:18)

2. Past offensive biological research and development programmes:

- **NO**

3. Past defensive biological research and development programmes:

- **NO**

Declaration of vaccine production facilities#1

1. Name of facility:

SBL Vaccin AB (Solna)

2. Location (mailing address):

SE-105 21 Stockholm, Sweden

3. General description of the types of diseases covered:

Diarrhoea, ETEC/Cholerae (one vaccine component for pooling with other components)

Declaration of vaccine production facilities#2

1. Name of facility:

UniTech Biopharma

2. Location (mailing address):

Box 219, SE-864 31 Matfors, Sweden

3. General description of the types of diseases covered:

Diarrhoea, ETEC/Cholerae (culturing on commission)
