About the BTWC

About the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction — more commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) — was simultaneously opened for signature in Moscow, Washington and London on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.

The Convention bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, in types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The actual use of biological weapons is prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Article VIII of the BTWC recognizes that nothing contained in the Convention shall be construed as a derogation from the obligations contained in the Geneva Protocol. As of November 2001, 162 states had signed the BTWC and 144 of these had ratified it (List of Signatories and Ratifications).

Main Articles

Article I defines the scope of the BTWC’s prohibition (the so-called general purpose criterion). This includes all microbial and other biological agents or toxins and their means of delivery. Subsequent Review Conferences have reaffirmed that the general purpose criterion encompasses all future scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. The objects themselves (biological agents or toxins) are not prohibited, only their purpose. Permitted purposes are defined as prophylactic, protective and other peaceful purposes. The objects may not be retained in quantities that have no justification or which are inconsistent with the permitted purposes.
Article II requires each State Party, no later than nine months after entry into force of the Convention, to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I.
Article III prohibits States Parties from transferring or otherwise encouraging other states or organizations to acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I.
Article IV requires States Parties to take any necessary national measures (e.g., passage of national laws) to prohibit and prevent the misuse of biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery within their territories. Only a small number of States Parties have implemented this provision.
In Article V, States Parties undertake to consult with one another and to cooperate in solving any problems that may arise in relation to the Convention.
Under Article VI, any State Party finding another State Party acting in breach of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. States Parties will cooperate in carrying out any investigation the Security Council may initiate on the basis of the complaint. The Security Council will inform States Parties of the results of the investigation.
In Article VII, States Parties undertake, if requested, to assist any Party which the Security Council decides has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.
Article VIII stipulates that nothing in the Convention shall in any way limit or detract from obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol.
Article IX commits States Parties to continue negotiations in good faith towards a chemical weapons convention.
In Article X, States Parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.
In Article XII, provision is made for a conference of States Parties to the Convention to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Such Review Conferences have been held at five yearly intervals and have agreed Final Declarations which have contained extended understandings of the Convention.